The Trouble with the Confederacy
The linchpin of party’s GOTV strategy is predicated on a
belief that organizations it exercises little control over will rise up and do
the heavy lifting necessary to win elections. The model positions the DPG as
the operational hub coordinating the activities of Country Parties and
traditional allies like Labor Unions and Civil Right groups.
Our current model is one of “Confederation". It consist of a small, weak central
authority which attempts to expand its limited authority to extend the DPG
brand, fundraise and mobilize using a mix of organizations that may or may not
have an effective statewide reach or with local organizations which may or may
not be able to muster its own membership for the duration of the mobilization
effort.
After 12 years in the political wilderness and staring at another four
or maybe eight years of the same, we need to make a cold, sober assessment of
this model's effectiveness with a particular focus on the confederation with the County Parties.
The fundamental challenge both the state party and statewide candidates
have faced is that county parties are an unpredictable partner in substantive
statewide GOTV efforts. We need to understand why, but we also should be clear
that the problems we face are institutional in nature and have little to do
with current or even recent leadership at the local party level. More
importantly, it has been the DPG responsibility to fix the problems and it has
neglected to do so. If we are going to return to a competitive position, we
must address these issues.
Born in a Different Era
Georgia’s Democratic County Parties
were born largely in an era when all of Georgia was deeply blue and GOTV
apparatus was neither developed nor needed. Local Parties simply never
developed in a way that lends itself to the type of visibility and
organizational heft necessary to make the substantial effort in fundraising and
infrastructure development required to close the numerical gap we are seeing.
For some counties, the money flowed easily to support local Dems. For others, there was never a need to raise money because there
was little or no opposition presence in the county: Since the GOP had no money and
no infrastructure, why should the Dems bother to build their own?
This problem has been compounded
by suburbanization and gerrymandering. Our Core Counties have become so
Democratic and our elected officials so safely seated that for races internal
to the county,
there is no need to configure the organization in a manner that supports GOTV
efforts for County offices or even the state legislatures. As a result there’s
literally no machinery to support statewide nominees when the State Party asks
the Counties to step up.
Operationally Disconnected from the Grassroots
There is an even more
fundamental issue at play. County parties, born in a different era, have grown
up with a deliberative orientation rather than an operational orientation. They
are organized to facilitate diverse and equal representation at monthly
meetings and to make sure all voices are heard. There is nothing wrong with
that,
and given state history it was important to make sure we got that right and generally
speaking we did. That was an incredibly important thing to do at the time but
it has wound up being an end unto itself.
The problem is that because
of when we formed up county organization, the state was deeply Democratic; and we
put an inordinate focus in how the county committee is composed and who was in
charge rather than the task at hand. The problem is the focus has been on
coming together as a party and celebrating our diversity and unity rather than
on developing lower level (precinct/grassroots) organizations, which
is needed for GOTV efforts.
Mahoning County, OH
Take
a look at the County Committee. It has 321 members that is roughly the
same size as our entire State Party. Its Executive Committee has nearly 100
members; that’s larger than any county party in the state of Georgia; They
have 11 officers!
This
is a county the size of Chatham. Turnout in Mahoning was 69% (122,000) in
2012 with the President getting 64% of the vote. On the surface it weems like organization overkill given the solid but unspectacular performance.
Bur ccording to Chris Redfern, Ohio Party Chair, the Mahoning Dems actually raised $1 Million in 2012. The
difference is those 321 positions at the Precinct level. Each Precinct sends
its captain to Central Committee. (There are just five vacancies, by the way)
But that “Big“ committee raised about $3,000 per precinct in a precinct that
averages less than 1,000 people and 2/3rds of the voters are Democrats.
Understand this. In 2012, the Youngtown Democratic Party alone raised more money than the Democratic Party of Georgia and all the county parties combined.
The reason is inclusiveness and visibility in every conrener of the county which in turn drives fundraising and party dominance in local politics even if the cote totals are somewhat pedestrian.
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We tend to define our
membership by those who are elected to serve as committee members. We tend not
to have any established purpose for our members other than to attend meetings.
We tend to be more concerned about the meetings rather than why we meet. We tend
to be insular and largely benign
and disconnected from the voting public.
As a result, Local parties are disconnected from sufficient sets of
those “Boots on the Ground" who can support election efforts with their
voices or their front yards or their bank accounts.
Because of the way County Parties have developed in this state, they are
not centers of political power, and
outside of the elected official and candidate class, they are largely unknown
entities that are largely incapable of delivering the type of turnout
necessary in off year elections as they are currently oriented.
Re-orientating
the County Party from one focused on “Post Holder” to one energized by “Precinct
Captain” is extremely difficult because it is such a completely different
paradigm than what we know.
The County Parties have not successfully navigated the changes in
statewide demographics and politics or the general abandonment of the party by
more conservative white voters because the DPG has not told them to or trained
them for operational success. Even if the training was available and accessible, the underlying fact is that there are
substantial cultural hurdles to transforming a county party from a
deliberative association to a “political machine".
County parties ought to be a dominant force across the political landscape in larger counties across the state, but they are not. It would be incredibly subjective to characterize the vitatality and political vigor of the county parties. There is an ebb abd flow to these things and county parties are at different leveles of maturation and atrophy. Suffice it so say, our statewide and statehouse candidates need them to be powerful institutions to drive political commerce and high vote totals. That they are not the GOTV machines we need them to be should not be in dispute.
Organizationally Disconnected from the State Party
Even if we could retool, reorganize and reorient the County Party system for statewide purposes, there is a more fundamental challenge that inhibits the type of reform that is needed.
County Parties, while chartered by the State Party, do not operate as local units of the DPG (I.e. a Field Organization). They are largely autonomous organizations that the DPG has little authority over. There is nothing in the state bylaws that speaks to any authority of the state party has to compel the local parties to do anything at all. The State Party Charter alludes to such authority but only in passing and has not truly in any operational sense ever exercised its theoretical authority.
C7.2 Duties of County Committees shall be to elect State Committee members, promote development of Party organizations and activities, to seek and encourage qualified candidates for public office, to support Democratic nominees, to perform such primary and election functions as are required by law, to maintain appropriate records, to promote and add logistical support to the State Affirmative Action Program, to raise funds for the above purposes, and to perform such other duties as may be required by the State Committee.
The state party has not asked the counties to change their perspective and priorities. It’s not going to happen. DPG has no authority and no resources to leverage or control what the County Parties do or don’t do.
If the County parties operated as local units and their leadership reported up the chain to the DPG Chair, it would be far easier and we might have better outcomes on state races, but that is not our reality. The prospects for retooling the Counties for what is necessary are presently bleak. There are too many counties, too many personalities, too many varied local histories to navigate and way too many operational challenges.
Rather than working doggedly when there is not a looming election to fix these challenges by developing the types of organization and tools needed at the local level, the state party has sat on its hands and in some ways shut county party leadership out of places of authority within the DPG organization when it ought to seem obvious that inclusion in the affairs of the State Party would be beneficial for both sides, let alone Georgia Democrats.
Let’s be clear: The challenges we face are the result of 50 years of benign neglect and not the neglect of current leadership at any level. The writing has been on the wall since 1964. Democrats in Georgia held power for two generations after the Voting Rights Act while doing precious little to build any sort of statewide political infrastructure. That neglect, exposed again and again in shrinking vote margins, which ultimately collapsed in 2002, has remained neglected until today.
Precisely when the DPG ceased to be an extension of the Governor’s office in January, 2003 there needed to be a concerted effort to build a new type of field organization to support statewide candidates. But that never happened and the County Parties never grew to be more than they had historically been.
The dominoes that began to fall from 2002 (because we chose not to act) have severely damaged our visibility and our ability to fundraise. In turn, it has hurt our ability to message and run statewide campaigns; in turn it has created a credibility gap and ultimately a GOP supermajority and being shut out of the Executive.
Bobby Kahn failed to act. Jane Kidd failed to act. Mike Berlon failed to act. But neither did the State Committee and there are all sort of resons for that.. Perhaps DuBose Porter will move the issue to the front burner and bring it to the boil. But we should not be dependednt wholly upon the State Chair to champion this issue. It must come from the grassroots up. The State Party needs a concerted effort to try and fix these issues. There is quite literally too much at stake to wait for better demographics.
Copeland said voters shouldn’t confine themselves to one political party when trying to find a candidate to rally behind, and expressed his belief that Deraney would do a good job in the legislature.
