There are times when we must speak up against a fellow Democrat!

I am stunned  by this article. The President of a Democratic Party  Organization has endorsed A Republican over  an incumbent  Democrat! 

http://www.news-daily.com/news/2013/oct/08/deraney-to-run-for-state-house-district-78-as-a/ 

The district includes southeast Clayton County and parts of Republican-leaning Henry County. Portions of Jonesboro and Stockbridge and all of Lovejoy are in the district.

#Parts of Deraney’s message aren’t typical for a Republican, and he acknowledges that fact. Some of the people he said should be reached out to are lesbians, gays, bisexuals and transgendered individuals who are not usually embraced by the Republican party.#

But Deraney’s candidacy announcement wasn’t the typical political coming out party. From the beginning, it oozed a feeling of reaching out and inclusion when he was introduced by Young Democrats of Atlanta President T.J. Copeland, an old classmate and friend of Deraney.#

Copeland said voters shouldn’t confine themselves to one political party when trying to find a candidate to rally behind, and expressed his belief that Deraney would do a good job in the legislature.

#“The biggest thing is finding individuals that represent the state of Georgia and represent your ideology, and not just sticking to one particular person in a party, or one particular party,” said Copeland.#

“It’s about finding out who that person is and what they will represent when they go to represent you down at the Capital or in D.C., and I honestly cannot think of one individual in this district that will do a better job than Chris,” Copeland added

#Copeland also implored attendees to give money to Deraney’s campaign, explaining it could cost the candidate as much as $40,000 to run what is expected to be a campaign against incumbent Rep. Demetrius Douglas (D-Stockbridge).

 There are certain things  that  require  comment.  So here is mine


An Officer  of  a Democratic  organization endorsing  a Republican  for  a statehouse seat  when   it is occupied  by  a Democrat,  when  we are on the cusp of a  GOP super-majority is an unfathomable and unconscionable thing to do.   

I get  friendship....that's fine.    You want to vote for him?  That's your business.   You want to write a check?   OK.  But you do not endorse ANY Republican  while touting you bona fides as a YD Pres.   It is  completely irresponsible.  Moreover in  this political environment this  is,  in my view, a treasonous  thing to do.  Not simply  because   it's an endorsement but  because it has the effect of  giving the GOP  the meme that Democratic leadership  is abandoning ship.  It damages  the Democratic Brand  and is  a betrayal of the first order of those that elected you to lead  Young Democrats.

To say nothing of the  political reality   that  Kasim Reed  went to High School with Demetrius Douglas.   Which quite honestly is not  a fight you  want to need It hurts you and it Hurts the YDs.

I do not understand people who  run  for party office who think  they have no  responsibility  for the success  of the Party? 

The Atlanta  Young Democrats  cannot ignore this   because to let this stand is  to de-legitimize its value  as a party organization  and its credibility with both elected leadership  throughout the  Metro Area.  How does this organization  raise money for Democratic candidates when their  President says:

“The biggest thing is finding individuals that represent the state of Georgia and represent your ideology, and not just sticking to one particular person in a party, or one particular party,”

How  will they know how that money is going to be spent?  This is the equivalent of  Chairman DuBose Porter endorsing Karen Handel of  the Senate.


I have known TJ Copeland for a number  of years.  He is a member of the  State Committee.  He ran  for State Rep last  election.  He is a likable and smart man.   I do not understand  this AT ALL.

TJ Copeland should  either  retract  the endorsement or resign as YD Atlanta President and if he  refuses, then they should  show them the door.  Any Democrat  who  defends his actions should be shown the door as well.


In the meantime  I would encourage you  to give to  the Demetrius Douglas Campaign because  he  is almost certainly  going to be targeted by the GOP for defeat.

This says it all

Governor Jason Carter?

Galloway is reporting that State Senator Jason Carter is polling about  a run for governor in 2014.    Certainly  with  the Governor facing  some  ethics issues and two somewhat viable primary opponents challenging him on his flanks, the opportunity to  win exists.  I am not convinced  Carter is going to make a run as he has  been pretty adamant  that he had little interest in 2014.  Nothng  wrong  with polling though.

But  the news  that he might jump in  now as opposed to waiting  until 2018 with  a much more  crowded field creates  a whole host of  permutations of dominoes falling in different directions.

One has to wonder  who might jump in to other  Constitutional offices in 2014 and how quickly they  will be able to  lay the groundwork  and  freeze the field.   
One also has to wonder  what Mayor Reed  will do if  Carter runs and wins and what he does  with his considerable  campaign coffers post-primary.

One also has to wonder  about  what happens in the 2016 run  for the Isakson Senate Seat as many observers  feel  he may not be running again.

A Carter run certainly means  the state would be flush with  outside cash  for 2014 with both the  DSCC and  the DGA looking  favorably at Georgia and opening up their considerable coffers and don't think for a second that  Team Hillary is not watching very carefully as are those  wanting to  lead in-state efforts in 2016.  Money is not going to be a deciding issue for Carter but the  money game abong the Hidgh Dollars Donors is most certainly underway.

From where I sit a lot is going  to depend on  DPG Chairman DuBose Porter's ability to both  fund and find an Executive  Director and then  the ED's ability to  build  the organizational capacity to funnel national dollars for media buys and build  a field organization capable of adequately  getting  out the vote some  12 months from now.  That is a hugely important  undertaking and one in which the  candidates and potential candidates are going to be  monitoring  very closely.

Then next few weeks are going to be  highly entertaining.











  

TIME FOR A REALITY CHECK

Our approach to Statewide GOTV is a Failure

Our GOTV strategies fail our statewide candidates and the party faithful time and time again because the DPG lacks the ability and capacity to command the resources necessary to claw our way back into contention. The problem facing Georgia Democrats has never been whether the voters existed to win statewide. It has been a question of how to get them to the polls. The problem is with our ability to execute the strategy.

The confederated approach which creates loose partnerships with county parties and our usual partners simply is not getting it done.

In the last 12 years, despite a huge increase in the size of the electorate; in spite a huge increase in Hispanic residents; despite our nominee for president being African American…twice. In spite of adding 520,000 net new voters in our 31 firewall counties, the net of all our efforts was closing the gap with the GOP by 662 votes. We are still 300,000 votes down. To the Democratic outsider, both the state and the local party are defined by their closed off structures. And those structures, whether by archaic design or benign neglect are not presently capable of changing outcomes.

Obviously there are other factors in play. The problem is that lacking any other institutional mechanism that could be leveraged, the DPG and by extension our candidates have no option but to rely on a largely autonomous County Party system. We need to fix the problem. Unfortunately, we have elections every two years and we never seem to get to it.

It’s Not about Money

Money will not solve the challenges that we face. To be clear, at the moment it is a huge challenge, and while it is easy and probably appropriate and maybe even therapeutic to point fingers, it is not the real issue. Money will not solve a single one of our operational issues unless we have the will to change what we have been doing since 2002.

It’s not about Atlanta vs. The rest of the State

The supposition that we are failing because the DPG is too Atlanta-centric also needs to be fact-checked. Those of us who live in Atlanta know better. While it is true that the State Committee is dominated by “Atlantans,” that shouldn’t be confused with an institutional bias.

The DPG exerts no more influence on either the political apparatus or the political landscape in Fulton than it does in Chatham, and the institutional County Parties in the metro area exert no influence on the DPG whatsoever.

The truth of it is that the DPG’s political footprint doesn’t really extend beyond the Downtown Connector: from the Atlanta Waterworks to the Gold Dome. The DPG has no more institutional presence in Gwinnett or DeKalb than it does in Dougherty or Muscogee. And that’s the problem. What State Committee members and politicos from outside the Perimeter don’t see is that in its present condition the DPG’s geo-political orientation; influence and bias are virtually non-existent to begin with. The DPG itself is no stronger in Clayton County than it is in Clarke or Lowndes.

Does anybody really think that relocating party headquarters to Macon is THE silver bullet that will restore power, prestige and presence to the DPG?

It’s not about who is Chair

We have just concluded the tenure of a chair that was, to put it mildly, ineffective on many fronts. The natural course of organizational dysfunction is to blame the person at the top. But the truth of it is, the office of DPG chair is a weak position in charge of a weak and small organization. While the Chair certainly can control the organization by charisma and political machination, they still lack the ability to truly transform the Party.

We are a big state; the DPG is a paper thin organization with little or no apparatus for the Chair to maintain or let alone strengthen and wield either for his own agenda or on behalf of our nominees or those who call themselves Democrats. The reality is the Chair’s authority over statewide politics or statewide GOTV efforts is truly meager.

“Back in the day” maybe that was ok, when there was not a need for apparatus and we held the governorship without any effort at all. But those days are likely gone forever. And largely due to benign neglect, the position of Chair has atrophied to little more than Chief Spokesman and Chief Fundraiser rather than head of a substantive and powerful organization.

The Chair has been dealt a bad hand for years and then gets the blame for bluffing or folding.

We need a reality check. We need to stop the incessant blame game that has dominated the DPG since 2002. Any sober assessment of vote totals, or money, or organizational bias ought to bring us back to one underlying issue: The DPG lacks the visibility, vitality and vigor to lead the electorate a different political reality.

The core problem we face as a party is really one of branding and physical presence where it counts come Election Day. We are an invisible party to virtually all of the electorate.

A Critical Moment

For the last 12 years Georgia Democrats have been told repeatedly that our fortunes are about to be restored; that Georgia voters will soon return to their senses; that with a few strategic tweaks to what we have done in the past, a solid ticket and a promised demographic shift that we will be back in the game. It has not worked out yet and there is nothing that the DPG is doing today to insure that it will work out in 2014 or 2016. 

It is time to admit that we are in the political wilderness and that unless we make some significant changes we will be there for another 10 years. I just happen to  think an opportunity exists to change our trajectory sooner rather than later.

The Trouble with the Confederacy - Why Democrats faill on Election Day in Georgia (Part III)

Our Current GOTV Model has Substantial Problems

Under our current methodology for Statewide GOTV, the County Party’s role is not really different than that of our expected friends and allies. The DPG relies on all of these groups to supply the boots on the ground to get the job done. All of these organizations partner with the DPG to one degree or another and muster the troops for early voting and Election Day.

The Congressional District chairs, who are elected from within the State Committee, theoretically “Run Point” on the efforts of County Parties in support of Statewide and Congressional campaigns:  providing communication 

and monitoring between the parties and the DPG high command. But the role is not operational or formal because the relationship between the DPG and the county parties is no more operational or formal than are the relationships with Labor or Civil Rights groups. County parties are simply another ally in our campaigns. The state party can make no quantitative demands on the counties and has no effective way to measure the local party’s efficacy on turnout except after the fact when the returns start rolling in. 

Because of the general informality of the relationship with the 120 CPs (those closest to the voter, those closest to small dollar donors, those closest to volunteers) the DPG’s ability to strengthen the local party is substantially impeded. This casual confederation means the DPG lacks the ability to extend its presence and brand and that creates additional problem with loyalty, fundraising candidate recruitment, and mobilization. What goes for coordination fades to the background by November 8th each cycle.

Our statewide candidates are substantially  hamstrung by  this  ineffective and inefficient  GOTV Model  It impedes their ability to get volunteers  to knock on doors and make  phone calls  so they wind up  going it alone  and  the volunteers they do muster  wind up stepping  on each other's toes  and  knocking on the same doors repeatedly rather than efficiently.

To be sure, the county parties have their own set of challenges that only exacerbates these identifiable problems. The DPG as it is presently positioned has no ability or leverage or inclination to fix what ails the County Parties. Currently, our network of county parties, our weak partnerships, is all we have to work with within the party’s structure. We need to recognize that it is not simply that the DPG is broke but rather that it is broken.

Next Stage Development of the County Party is a significant challenge

I believe in County Parties. I want them to be strong and vibrant and able to command the respect of both the local candidates and the local community. 

What I am not convinced of is that the county parties can transform themselves in the short term to be a substantial and reliable partner to what the DPG is presently incapable of doing by itself. Effectively supporting statewide candidates and legislative candidates at either the state or national level.

The truth of it is there is no political will to change the essential character of the local party within the DPG and there are a myriad of reasons for that.

• There is institutional inertia.
• There is a need to fundamentally change the State Bylaws if we want to put the local parties on the DPG org chart.
• There are too many county parties to try and micromanage top down.
• The position of DPG Chair is not strong enough to transform the local parties for statewide purposes.

But I am also not convinced that a path that moves the county parties into the DPG org chart is the best long term solution either. The state party has to figure out how that is going to work. Even if it attempted to do so, the fundamental challenges would be that the Country chair would be asked to serve two masters: the County Party membership that put the local chair into power and DPG HQ telling the local party they need “X” turnout in these key precincts,  Without a standard for performance and  the ability to make changes in local  leadership  it would seem to me that the DPG would have no more authority ove  county GOTV efforts then it does today. and any attempt ti  overturn   a locall party election is fraught  with certain  backlash and peril.

It would take a lot of thought, a very deliberate effort, and a very strong DPG leadership over the course of the next three to five election cycles to reorient both the DPG and the counties to effect that type of organization that can drive message and action through the county parties to the boots on the ground where it would have the impact that is necessary.

That is for the DPG to figure out. My concern, as a fiercely loyal institutional Democrat, is what to do in the meantime? Given the current capabilities of the County Parties and the State Party’s inability to effectively leverage or manage their GOTV performance, clearly a new approach is necessary.

But given the historic autonomy of the County organizations,  given the inability of  the state party to invest  in the county parties and given the inability to use a carrot or a stick. It really does not seem to be practical or useful.

Our approach to Statewide GOTV is a Failure

Our GOTV strategies fail our statewide candidates and the party faithful time and time again because the DPG lacks the ability and capacity to command the resources necessary to claw our way back into contention. The problem facing Georgia Democrats has never been whether the voters existed to win statewide. It has been a question of how to get them to the polls. The problem is with our ability to execute the strategy.

The confederated approach which creates loose partnerships with county parties and our usual partners simply is not getting it done.

In the last 12 years, despite a huge increase in the size of the electorate; in spite a huge increase in Hispanic residents; despite our nominee for president being African American…twice. In spite of adding 520,000 net new voters in our 31 firewall counties, the net of all our efforts was closing the gap with the GOP by 662 votes. We are still 300,000 votes down. To the Democratic outsider, both the state and the local party are defined by their closed off structures. And those structures, whether by archaic design or benign neglect are not presently capable of changing outcomes.

Obviously there are other factors in play. The problem is that lacking any other institutional mechanism that could be leveraged, the DPG and by extension our candidates have no option but to rely on a largely autonomous County Party system. We need to fix the problem. Unfortunately, we have elections every two years and we never seem to get to it.

Justice Department to challenge North Carolina voter ID law

By JOSH GERSTEIN | 9/30/13 12:03 AM EDT

The Justice Department will file suit against North Carolina on Monday, charging that the Tar Heel State’s new law requiring voters to show photo identification at the polls violates the Voting Rights Act by discriminating against African Americans, according to a person familiar with the planned litigation.

Attorney General Eric Holder is expected to announce the lawsuit at 11 a.m. Monday at Justice Department headquarters, flanked by the three U.S. Attorneys from North Carolina.

The suit, set to be filed in Greensboro, N.C., will ask that the state be barred from enforcing the new voter ID law, the source said. However, the case will also go further, demanding that the entire state of North Carolina be placed under a requirement to have all changes to voting laws, procedures and polling places “precleared” by either the Justice Department or a federal court, the source added.

Until this year, 40 North Carolina counties were under such a requirement. However, in June, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the formula Congress used to subject parts or all of 15 states to preclearance in recent decades.
The justices’ 5-4 ruling outraged civil rights advocates, but did not disturb a rarely-used “bail in” provision in the law that allows judges to put states or localities under the preclearance requirement. Civil rights groups and the Justice Department have since seized on that provision to try to recreate part of the regime that existed prior to the Supreme Court decision.

North Carolina Gov. Pat McCrory (R) signed the voter ID measure into law last last month.

“Common practices like boarding an airplane and purchasing Sudafed require photo ID and we should expect nothing less for the protection of our right to vote,” McCrory said at the time. “This new law brings our state in line with a healthy majority of other states throughout the country. This common sense safeguard is common-place.”

Read more:  Politico

The Trouble with the Confederacy - Why Democrats faill on Election Day in Georgia (Part II)

The Trouble with the Confederacy

The linchpin of party’s GOTV strategy is predicated on a belief that organizations it exercises little control over will rise up and do the heavy lifting necessary to win elections. The model positions the DPG as the operational hub coordinating the activities of Country Parties and traditional allies like Labor Unions and Civil Right groups.

Our current model is one of “Confederation". It consist of a small, weak central authority which attempts to expand its limited authority to extend the DPG brand, fundraise and mobilize using a mix of organizations that may or may not have an effective statewide reach or with local organizations which may or may not be able to muster its own membership for the duration of the mobilization effort.

After 12 years in the political wilderness and staring at another four or maybe eight years of the same, we need to make a cold, sober assessment of this model's effectiveness with a particular focus on the confederation with the County Parties.

The fundamental challenge both the state party and statewide candidates have faced is that county parties are an unpredictable partner in substantive statewide GOTV efforts. We need to understand why, but we also should be clear that the problems we face are institutional in nature and have little to do with current or even recent leadership at the local party level. More importantly, it has been the DPG responsibility to fix the problems and it has neglected to do so. If we are going to return to a competitive position, we must address these issues.

Born in a Different Era

Georgia’s Democratic County Parties were born largely in an era when all of Georgia was deeply blue and GOTV apparatus was neither developed nor needed. Local Parties simply never developed in a way that lends itself to the type of visibility and organizational heft necessary to make the substantial effort in fundraising and infrastructure development required to close the numerical gap we are seeing. For some counties, the money flowed easily to support local Dems. For others, there was never a need to raise money because there was little or no opposition presence in the county: Since the GOP had no money and no infrastructure, why should the Dems bother to build their own?

This problem has been compounded by suburbanization and gerrymandering. Our Core Counties have become so Democratic and our elected officials so safely seated that for races internal to the county, there is no need to configure the organization in a manner that supports GOTV efforts for County offices or even the state legislatures. As a result there’s literally no machinery to support statewide nominees when the State Party asks the Counties to step up.

Operationally Disconnected from the Grassroots

There is an even more fundamental issue at play. County parties, born in a different era, have grown up with a deliberative orientation rather than an operational orientation. They are organized to facilitate diverse and equal representation at monthly meetings and to make sure all voices are heard. There is nothing wrong with that, and given state history it was important to make sure we got that right and generally speaking we did. That was an incredibly important thing to do at the time but it has wound up being an end unto itself.

The problem is that because of when we formed up county organization, the state was deeply Democratic; and we put an inordinate focus in how the county committee is composed and who was in charge rather than the task at hand. The problem is the focus has been on coming together as a party and celebrating our diversity and unity rather than on developing lower level (precinct/grassroots) organizations, which is needed for GOTV efforts.

Mahoning County, OH Take a look at the County Committee. It has 321 members that is roughly the same size as our entire State Party. Its Executive Committee has nearly 100 members; that’s larger than any county party in the state of Georgia; They have 11 officers! This is a county the size of Chatham. Turnout in Mahoning was 69% (122,000) in 2012 with the President getting 64% of the vote. On the surface it weems like organization overkill given the solid but unspectacular performance. Bur ccording to Chris Redfern, Ohio Party Chair, the Mahoning Dems actually raised $1 Million in 2012. The difference is those 321 positions at the Precinct level. Each Precinct sends its captain to Central Committee. (There are just five vacancies, by the way) But that “Big“ committee raised about $3,000 per precinct in a precinct that averages less than 1,000 people and 2/3rds of the voters are Democrats. Understand this.  In 2012, the Youngtown Democratic Party alone  raised  more money than  the Democratic Party of Georgia and all the county parties  combined.   The reason is inclusiveness and visibility in every conrener of the county  which  in turn  drives  fundraising and  party dominance in local politics even if   the  cote totals  are somewhat  pedestrian.

We tend to define our membership by those who are elected to serve as committee members. We tend not to have any established purpose for our members other than to attend meetings. We tend to be more concerned about the meetings rather than why we meet. We tend to be insular and largely benign and disconnected from the voting public.

As a result, Local parties are disconnected from sufficient sets of those “Boots on the Ground" who can support election efforts with their voices or their front yards or their bank accounts.

Because of the way County Parties have developed in this state, they are not centers of political power, and outside of the elected official and candidate class, they are largely unknown entities that are largely incapable of delivering the type of turnout necessary in off year elections as they are currently oriented.

Re-orientating the County Party from one focused on “Post Holder” to one energized by “Precinct Captain” is extremely difficult because it is such a completely different paradigm than what we know.

The County Parties have not successfully navigated the changes in statewide demographics and politics or the general abandonment of the party by more conservative white voters because the DPG has not told them to or trained them for operational success. Even if the training was available and accessible, the underlying fact is that there are substantial cultural hurdles to transforming a county party from a deliberative association to a “political machine".

County parties  ought to be  a dominant force across the political landscape  in larger counties across the state, but they are not.  It would be incredibly subjective   to   characterize the  vitatality  and  political vigor of the  county parties.  There is an  ebb abd  flow to   these things  and   county parties  are at different leveles of maturation and  atrophy.  Suffice it so say, our statewide and statehouse  candidates need them  to be  powerful institutions to drive political commerce  and high  vote totals.  That they are not  the GOTV machines  we need them to be should not be in dispute.

Organizationally Disconnected from the State Party

Even if we could retool, reorganize and reorient the County Party system for statewide purposes, there is a more fundamental challenge that inhibits the type of reform that is needed.

County Parties, while chartered by the State Party, do not operate as local units of the DPG (I.e. a Field Organization). They are largely autonomous organizations that the DPG has little authority over. There is nothing in the state bylaws that speaks to any authority of the state party has to compel the local parties to do anything at all. The State Party Charter alludes to such authority but only in passing and has not truly in any operational sense ever exercised its theoretical authority.

C7.2 Duties of County Committees shall be to elect State Committee members, promote development of Party organizations and activities, to seek and encourage qualified candidates for public office, to support Democratic nominees, to perform such primary and election functions as are required by law, to maintain appropriate records, to promote and add logistical support to the State Affirmative Action Program, to raise funds for the above purposes, and to perform such other duties as may be required by the State Committee. 

The state party has not asked the counties to change their perspective and priorities. It’s not going to happen. DPG has no authority and no resources to leverage or control what the County Parties do or don’t do.

If the County parties operated as local units and their leadership reported up the chain to the DPG Chair, it would be far easier and we might have better outcomes on state races, but that is not our reality. The prospects for retooling the Counties for what is necessary are presently bleak. There are too many counties, too many personalities, too many varied local histories to navigate and way too many operational challenges.

Rather than working doggedly when there is not a looming election to fix these challenges by developing the types of organization and tools needed at the local level, the state party has sat on its hands and in some ways shut county party leadership out of places of authority within the DPG organization when it ought to seem obvious that inclusion in the affairs of the State Party would be beneficial for both sides, let alone Georgia Democrats.

Let’s be clear: The challenges we face are the result of 50 years of benign neglect and not the neglect of current leadership at any level. The writing has been on the wall since 1964. Democrats in Georgia held power for two generations after the Voting Rights Act while doing precious little to build any sort of statewide political infrastructure. That neglect, exposed again and again in shrinking vote margins, which ultimately collapsed in 2002, has remained neglected until today.

Precisely when the DPG ceased to be an extension of the Governor’s office in January, 2003 there needed to be a concerted effort to build a new type of field organization to support statewide candidates. But that never happened and the County Parties never grew to be more than they had historically been.


The dominoes that began to fall from 2002 (because we chose not to act) have severely damaged our visibility and our ability to fundraise. In turn, it has hurt our ability to message and run statewide campaigns; in turn it has created a credibility gap and ultimately a GOP supermajority and being shut out of the Executive.

Bobby Kahn failed to act.  Jane Kidd failed to act.  Mike Berlon  failed to act. But neither did the  State Committee and  there are all sort of resons  for that.. Perhaps  DuBose Porter  will move the issue to  the front burner and  bring it to the boil.  But we should not be dependednt  wholly upon the State Chair to  champion this issue. It must  come  from the grassroots up.  The State Party  needs  a concerted effort  to try and fix these issues.  There is quite  literally  too much at stake  to wait  for  better demographics.

Why Democrats Fail on Election Day in Georgia - Part I

A HISTORY OF FAILED APPROACHES
The challenges we face as a party are not insurmountable. What is clear however is that the top-down strategies we have developed and run with over the last decade have not worked. There are many reasons for that problem
.
The State Party’s most significant challenge is the lack of a significant field organization and a stark failure of what goes for infrastructure to deliver the vote for our candidates. Our strategies fail because we do not have sufficient boots on the ground in enough places or the right places or the right time to get things done. A realistic assessment of what we have been able to achieve using a “159 County Strategy” or a Metro Atlanta Strategy or even a Coordinated Campaign Strategy is that they have not worked at a statewide level. 

The main reason for this is that the strategy’s success is premised largely on the notion that the county parties and traditional allies, lie Unions, Civil Rights organizations, church-based organizations and the campaigns themselves will be able to muster the resources to wage an effective Get Out the Vote effort. For the last 12 years at least this game plan has failed, mortally.

The State Party keeps trying this in various forms but it continues to come up short.

The most recent iteration was a call for 5% greater Democratic turnout in every Georgia County -- a seemingly achievable goal -- to close the gap with the Republican Standard Bearer and support down ballot candidates. It was a call that went largely unanswered.

• Fifteen Counties, less than one in ten, achieved the goal and the net effect was 7,633 votes compared to 2008.

• 36 counties, less than one in four, got better Democratic numbers than in 2008. The difference amounted to less than 13,500 votes.

• Only 1/3rd of those 31 most reliable Democratic Counties did better than they did 4 years ago and the 31 combined represented a net loss of 50,000 votes compared to 2008.

The 2012 numbers suggest a significant problem with GOTV efforts using this method. To be clear, strategies employed early in the decade fared no better and there is little to suggest that 2014 will be any different. Conventional wisdom and common sense suggests that Georgia Democrats are likely to lose all statewide races in 2014 unless we try a new approach.

The State Party does not have the infrastructure that is necessary to go out and beat the bushes to get the needed voters to the polls and it has tended to rely on either the county parties or the Unions and Civil Rights group to get out he votes, but it clearly has not been enough. We need to understand the nature of the problem.

Oh Good Grief. Not Again??!!??!

The Dangerous Reliance on the Inevitabiity of  Demographic Shift


There is a commonly held belief in Democratic circles that it is inevitable that by 2016 this state will be purple. The notion is based largely on a belief that an influx of Hispanic residents and an aging Republican base will allow us to pull even.

It is true that the GOP numbers are not pacing population growth and that they have maxed out their potential. It is true that “replacements voters” will be far more likely to be ideologically skewed to the Democratic Party in substantial ways. It is true that the Hispanic population is growing. But it is also true that the margin between the parties is increasing rather than decreasing.  But...

• There are 100,000 self-identifying Hispanic voters in Georgia, but over 850,000 Hispanics living here. That means about 12% of the adult Latino population is registered to vote and many may not be eligible.

• Half of the registered Hispanic voters were registered since the end of 2007. That’s great but it is only 50,000 voters and only 22,000 of those actually voted.

• While there are substantial shifts in the composition of the population that has not yet translated into any movement in the composition of the electorate at all in the last three elections.

• As importantly, it appears that only 20 to 30% of whites are voting for Democrats. And while there might be credible anecdotal information that whites under 35 might be trending Democratic, they certainly are not replacing older whites who are “exiting” the electorate. Moreover, of the 1.03 M Georgians under 30 who were registered prior to the 2010 Election only 13% showed up in both 2010 and 2012 and 53% never showed up at all.

• Finally, there is scarce evidence that the influx and influence of white transplants from “bluer” areas of the country to the Atlanta has had much effect, if any, on Democratic prospects in Georgia. The Atlanta region has grown by over 3 Million inhabitants since 1990 and accounted for 72% of the State’s growth. But by all accounts and measures the state is redder not bluer. Metro Atlanta certainly has not gotten bluer once you  get five miles  outside the Perimeter.

There is great news on the horizon; from the AJC’s Jim Galloway:

“Last month, Gov. Nathan Deal warned the Georgia GOP of the demographic perils that lie ahead – 56 percent of the state’s public school students are non-white. A few days later, the Atlanta Regional Commission said the trend was even stronger in metro Atlanta, where 63 percent of K-12 students are non-white”.

That’s great news 10 years from now. What we must understand is that the notion that shifts in demographics based on either race or age, while real in the general population, do not necessarily translate automatically to the electorate. More dangerously, this notion creates a false hope and as a consequence reinforces a certain historical passivity when it comes to doing what is necessary to change outcomes in Georgia at the statewide level.

The bottom line is that we are not registering enough voters in Democratic areas and those we are registering are not showing up in numbers that close the numerical gap. It is the main reason we are losing.

The fundamental question that must be answered is whether the 350,000 votes we need to win statewide races in 2014 even exist? The short answer is yes, obviously.

• First of all, we know there are 1.8 Million Democrats in Georgia because they voted for the President.

• In 2010, we received 1.1M votes in the Governor’s race but lost by 260,000 votes. The simple math is that we need to get 300K from the 750K extra votes we see in Presidential years to be competitive in Gubernatorial years.

• Beyond these numbers there is another universe of 1.5 M voters who did not vote in 2012 at all with 555K of those were in reliably Democratic Counties

Fundamentally, election after election we are seeing the same numerical gap. Voters are not self-motivated in sufficient numbers and our GOTV infrastructure has not been able to motivate sufficient additional numbers to close the gap.

What makes this particularly distressing is that we keep doing the same thing over and over somehow expecting a different result.

Either  we  wait ten years.  or we fix the problem now.  350,000 vote   really is not that heavy a lift.  We simply have to get organizationally and operationally savvy as Democrats across the board.

Challenging numbers

Democratic Opportunity and Challenges Exist

There are serious problems in our most Democratic Counties with both registration and GOTV efforts that have to be understood and corrected if we are going to win ANY statewide races.

The votes clearly exist to be truly competitive in statewide races. Our challenge is, as it has been for the last 32 years, getting Democratic voters to the polls to vote for Democrats. The data suggests that as a party we have not cracked the code. And this ought to be the heart of our concern.

• Of the 825,000 registered voters in these 31 firewall counties who did not show up in 2012, 72% were in Democratic Precincts. Of the other 235,000 non-voters from GOP precincts in Democratic Counties, 40,000 were African American and another 82,000 were white women.

• Voting Age Population in our firewall counties has increased by 250,000 people, but Democratic vote totals in these 31 counties has increased by only 110,000 in gubernatorial years. At the same time, we have seen a substantial shift in the Distribution of the GOP vote. In 2002, the GOP got 25% if their vote total for the 31 counties. By 2012 they were down to 21%. Virtually all the shift in GOP distribution has been to exurban Atlanta Counties. Those Counties have grown the most rapidly over the last decade and have come to represent their firewall.

• Turnout in our Tier I counties presents our most significant challenge. To offset the migration and growth in core GOP counties (GOP totals jumped by 330,000 in those counties over the past 12 years); we have got to get greater participation levels in our core. 

Our Challenge is that it turns out that the more Democratic a precinct is, the lower the participation in the political process. In the 566 most Democratic precincts in the 2010 Mid-terms, we saw a 43% Turnout compared to a statewide Turnout of 48%. In 2012, we saw a 67% Turnout in those deeply blue precincts as opposed to the statewide turnout level of 72%.

More troubling is in the Voter Conversion Rate (actual voters among those newly registered). 

• In 2008, in these 31 counties we registered some 200,000 new voters. The conversion rate for President Obama's first election was a
  
  respectable 65% for these core counties, but in 2010 only 27% of those voters showed up and last November 49% of these voters turned out. 

• In the run-up to 2010, there were 65,000 new registrants, but only 15,000 showed up. That is less than a 25% turnout. 

• In looking at 2012 there was a turnout among newly registered voters of 61% comparerd to a statewide  turnout of 72%

So we are  doing a fine job  at Registering voters (Though a lot of that  is certainly  related to  the efforts of  Obama For America)  but  for a variety  of reasons  we are having great difficulty   in getting those  new voters  to the polls.  

All of thes issues  beg the question: 

Who's got the ball  and  what are they doing with it?

I am not inclined to point a finger in any  particular direction  but it seems to me  that  the ability to  identify new  and sporaric voters in Democratic counties and  motivate them  to get to the polls has to be someone's  responsibilty and no one is doing a particularly good job at it.

Democratic Voter Turnout...Honestly

GOP Turnout has consolidated, entrenched, intensified and stalled

Republican growth in this state has slowed tremendously in Georgia over the last decade and has actually decreased relative to Voting Age Population in Presidential Elections and is flat in gubernatorial years.

Consider

• The net change in GOP Turnout over the last four years was a scant 30,000 votes.
• The good news is that 75% of that growth was in the Bedroom Counties of Cherokee, Forsyth, Hall and North Fulton. A good bit of that growth was people moving out of the core Atlanta counties rather than migration from out of state.
• 81 counties actually saw a net decrease in GOP votes in 2012 compared to 2008; effectively zeroing out the gains made in those four North Atlanta Counties.
• Another 41 counties (primarily rural) had an increase of less than 250 comparing Romney vs. McCain.
• In the 31 reliably Democratic counties, that provide about half of the Democratic Electorate (with the exception of Fulton which is a special case), only four counties saw any increase in GOP turnout amassing just 551 new votes between them.
• In Cobb and Gwinnett, once suburban stalwarts, there were fewer than 2,000 new Republican votes in 2012 despite 30,000 new registered voters over the four year period. And while those 31 Counties contributed just over half of Democratic Vote totals, these two “Republican Stalwarts” gave the next 25% of the Democratic state totals.

At the same time, we are seeing both anecdotally and empirically greater resolve among “Older white men.”. But we are also seeing another trend in comparing 2008 and 2012. In Republican leaning precincts, white female vote totals were down by 105,000 (about 10%) among those who voted in 2008 in spite of the overall vote being down by just 23,500.

We are seeing increased primary competition on the GOP side in statewide and statehouse races (evidenced obviously by the 2012 US Senate race to replace Saxby Chambliss) and a growing divide between the Libertarian/Tea Party wing and the more moderate establishment wing of the state GOP.

All this is good news, but it is not enough to win elections. Democrats took a small step back in 2012, and while they came down from what might be considered stratospheric numbers in 2008, or our vote deficit increased by some 50,000 votes. We need to understand why we are trending in the wrong direction.

A Fresh Look at the  Democratic  Firewall

Our ability to win statewide election is determined largely by our performance in about 25% of Georgia’s 159 Counties.

There are 31 counties (Tier I & Tier II) which went Democratic in each of the last three General Elections and 26 of those went Democratic the last four cycles. These counties contributed between 49 and 52% of the statewide Democratic total in each of the last 7 election. 94% of the most reliable Democratic precincts can be found in these Counties. Practically all of the Democratic members of the both the State House and Senate hail from these counties.  

This is the Democratic Firewall.

These 31 counties fall into two tiers. Tier I are the ten core counties in the top 6 metro areas in the state. These 10 Counties account for about 48% of state Democratic totals; the other 21 counties we always win but account only for a solid 3% of the Democratic totals.

There is a third group of counties, we either won in 2012 or we got a significant vote total (about 392,000) and contribute about 23% of democratic totals.

Distribution of Democratic Vote
 by County Tier

The remaining 26% of Democratic totals (462,000) come from either very GOP stronghold counties or very rural counties making up the rest of the state. While each of Georgia’s 159 counties is obviously important to our statewide totals, our most reliable Democratic counties present both out greatest opportunity and our greatest challenges in closing the gap in 2014.

12 years ago, these Tier I and Tier II counties represented 37% of the electorate. Today, they represent 35.83%. A small decrease to be sure. But these 31 counties have a voting population of 2.75 Million Adults, only 2.1 Million are registered and only 1.36 Million of those voters got to the polls in 2012.

These are not GOP voters who somehow forgot it was Election Day.

There are serious problems in our most Democratic Counties with both registration and GOTV efforts that have to be understood and corrected if we are going to win ANY statewide races.

These are not simple issues. There are  difficult  Party bylaws issue and looming turf  battles protected  by organizational and operational  minefields that will be  hard to avoid.  Our challenges with voter turnout particularly in a post-Obama environment ought to be at the heart of  every discussion among Party  and elected officials.  

Some of us  have been having this discusson in a Facebook group  for the last four months and there is a groundswell of  support to bring  new vitality and  Vigor to this issue.    Please consider joining  the conversation.

You can also Like our Facebook Page

Article of the day

http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/323233-weak-state-parties-weigh-down-senate-democrats-in-south

Weak state parties in the South risk hurting Democrats’ chances of holding — or gaining — critical Senate seats in 2014.

Struggles in Louisiana, Georgia and North Carolina could force national Democrats, and the candidates themselves, to step in with big-dollar investments to build get-out-the-vote programs that are often left to the party’s state-level operations.

“There’s a lot of drama in all of those places,” said one national Democratic strategist. “That means a lot more responsibility for coordinated campaigns in those states and really elevates the importance of field programs, things that are traditionally done by those state parties.”

All three states have endured turmoil at the top of their party structures, as scandals and power struggles have left efforts to build voter lists and recruit down-ballot candidates untended.

The consequences could be significant.  

Sens. Mary Landrieu (D-La.) and Kay Hagan (D-N.C.) face tough reelection fights, and Democrats are excited about the prospects of former nonprofit CEO Michelle Nunn (D) in Georgia.

But those candidates face increased jeopardy if the state leaders tasked with fixing their parties fail.

Read more: http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/323233-weak-state-parties-weigh-down-senate-democrats-in-south#ixzz2fpDVutdw 

It is Time to Evolve The DPG!

By the most obvious measure, vote margin, Georgia Democrats continue to proceed in a fundamentally wrong direction over the last several cycles. Republican victory margins have increased by 50,000 votes in each of the least three elections. It is not that more people are voting for the GOP; our people simply are not showing up. In comparing 2008 to 2012, the GOP Turnout was flat, a mere 17,000 more votes, but Democrats were down by 85,000.

In the Gubernatorial races, the margin trend is inconclusive for a variety of reasons but the 2010 GOP margin was twice what it was in 2002.

What we need to ask is whether the numbers are just so daunting that no strategy would ever have worked and that Republican gerrymandering in the aggregate actually reflects a new reality? Are we essentially no better positioned than either Alabama or South Carolina? And if so, do we need to prepare for a long period of retrenchment and reset our hopes? If Mark Sanford can come back after his hike down the “Appalachian Trail,” is there any hope at all?

The numbers are daunting. But our challenge has little to do with some sort of sweeping Red Tide that hit us first in 1980 when Ronald Reagan captured the South and instantly transformed the Electoral math for the next generation. There are actually some very hopeful signs that the red tide has stop surging and that somewhere in the not too distant future our prospects will begin to improve. There is data out there to support such a conclusion.

But we would be mistaken to be gleeful about that prospect for a number of reasons. It could be years before things improve. We need to get 350,000 more voters to the polls in 2014 than we did in 2010. It really is that simple. If we want to compete, that is what we have to do.

The challenges facing the Democratic Party of Georgia are substantial. There certainly is a financial component that cannot be minimized.

But the truth of it is, money has come to be thought of as a leading indicator of our success far more than racking of victories or vote totals. In fact, money is actually a trailing indicator of how the electorate -- and more importantly the donor base and the volunteer base -- view the party. Money is absolutely necessary to execute a winning strategy, but we have had money in the bank in the past, and it has not solved the underlying problems that have dogged the DPG for the last decade and a half. Managing to a budget is essential. Scheduling “Call Time” with “High Dollar Donors” is certainly an issue, but we ought to be far more concerned about global participation in the DPG’s Yellow Dog (recurring small dollar donor) program. It is a far more telling indicator of where we are as a state party.

It is mu contention that that our challenges with funding, like our challenges with getting out the vote, have much more to do with the visibility and vigor of the DPG than some would like to admit. The DPG has become fundamentally, woefully, disconnected from those whose help we need the most to execute whatever strategy we devise. Money does not solve that problem. Our challenges run to issues of organization and operations and, as direct consequence, brand. If we can fix those problems in fundamental ways, the votes and the money will flow.

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Over the next several days,  I am going to be posting sections  from the Evolve Document  I penned at the beginning of the summer.   I am doing so  to elicit more comments  from a larger audience in gearing up  for  what I anticipate is going to be   a  real substantive debate withing the State Committee about  Reform.